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There is increasing concern about the potential impact of the measures which 
some European Union countries are taking to prepare for the single currency. 
Under the terms of the Maastricht Treaty, countries have to satisfy a number of 
criteria to be eligible for economic and monetary union. In particular, countries 
are required to adhere to guidelines for their public finances which constrain 
both government borrowing and debt stocks. Since these restrictions imply a 
tighter fiscal stance than the current fiscal positions in most countries, it appears 
likely that some fiscal contraction is necessary if countries are to qualify for 
monetary union. At the same time, European unemployment has risen to 
historically high levels. This has led to fears that attempts to meet the Maastricht 
Fiscal Criteria will have a deflationary impact and further add to Europe’s 
serious unemployment problem.
This article uses the National Institute of Economic and Social Research global 
macro-econometric model (NiGEM) to examine the employment effects of 
attempts to satisfy the Maastricht Fiscal Criteria using a macro model. We begin 
by discussing the rationale for the use of fixed, common reference values for 
fiscal deficits and debt ratios in the Maastricht Treaty. There are two particularly 
important aspects to emphasise for our present analysis. First, the reference 
values are consistent with the average fiscal policies pursued over the past by 
many member states. This implies that some form of fiscal consolidation was to 
be expected in Europe after the cyclical downturn of the early 1990s, 
irrespective of the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty. Second, the Treaty 
allows some scope for debts and deficits to temporarily exceed the reference 
values. This raises the question of the extent of any fiscal consolidation required 
to satisfy the Treaty requirements at a particular time. We then review a number 
of existing studies of the impact of fiscal policy changes in Europe and illustrate 
the extent to which the results are dependent upon the baseline projections used 
for the policy simulations and the allowance for offsetting effects from monetary 
policy changes. Section III provides an overview of the structure and simulation 
properties of NiGEM, focusing on the structure of national labour markets and 
the use of policy rules.
In order to appraise the potential impact of the criteria it is necessary to adopt 
a baseline scenario for the European economies. Section IV outlines our base 
projections for the European economies and the prospects for economic and 
monetary union. The results of simulations in which all countries meet the fiscal 
criteria are then discussed in section V, along with an alternative scenario under 
which the Maastricht treaty criteria are abandoned, and countries pursue similar 



























































































II. The Maastricht Fiscal Convergence Criteria
There is a large body of recent literature on fiscal systems and the prospective 
impact of the Maastricht convergence criteria. This new work has considered 
both the theoretical justification for explicit fiscal criteria and the appropriate 
choice of indicators. There are two aspects to the theoretical analysis. First, there 
is the question of what fiscal limits governments should try to adhere to, and 
second, whether there is a need for supranational fiscal rules. We briefly review 
the literature on the appropriateness of the criteria and the predicted economic 
impact of adhering to them.
The Choice of Fiscal Rules
Ultimately the path of fiscal policy is guided by the need to ensure that the 
government remains solvent. There are a number of ways of approaching this 
question. A useful overview is provided by Blanchard et al. (1990). In general, 
a sustainable fiscal policy is one under which the prospective future debt-GDP 
ratio can be expected to stabilise. The evolution of the debt ratio depends upon 
both the primary budget deficit and the burden of debt interest payments. If an 
economy is dynamically efficient, the real interest rate exceeds the growth rate, 
and a primary surplus is necessary if the debt stock is to stabilise as a percentage 
of GDP. At the present time, countries with a high ratio of outstanding debt, 
such as Italy, Greece and Belgium, are likely to have to run a primary surplus 
in order to stabilise the overall debt ratio.
The need for solvency does not provide any guidance as to the appropriate level 
of the eventual debt and deficit ratios. The Maastricht Treaty suggests reference 
values of 60 per cent and 3 per cent respectively, reflecting the average record 
of those member states who pursued prudent fiscal policies in last two decades 
(Arrowsmith, 1995). A detailed account of the negotiations behind the treaty is 
provided by Bini-Smaghi et al. (1994). The deficit target is consistent in the 
long-term with the debt target if the long-term rate of growth of nominal GDP 
is 5 per cent, broadly in line with the rate of growth in the core countries of 
Germany, France and the Benelux countries over the past decade.
The Maastricht fiscal rules set objectives which differ from those presently 
adopted in a number of member countries. Some, such as the present UK 
administration, seek to pursue an objective of balancing the budget across the 
economic cycle as a whole. An alternative objective, adopted notably in 
Germany and the Netherlands, is that of the so-called ‘golden rule’, whereby on 
average the government only issues debt to finance net capital expenditure, so 




























































































which revenue can be obtained to meet interest payments. The Maastricht Treaty 
contains an ancillary provision (Article 104c) in which it is made clear that 
evaluation of the national budgetary stance should take into account whether the 
fiscal deficit exceeds investment expenditure, reflecting the objectives of many 
of the delegates involved in the treaty negotiations (Bini-Smaghi et al., 1994). 
There are practical problems associated with the pursuit of either of these 
alternative rules. A policy of balancing the budget over the economic cycle 
simply means that fiscal surpluses at times of strong economic growth must 
offset deficits at times of recession. Budgetary items such as unemployment 
benefit payments and corporate tax revenues are usually pro-cyclical, and hence 
the deficit would also display a cyclical pattern even if policy were, on balance, 
neutral. It is clear that many governments undertake considerable amounts of 
fiscal stabilisation (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994) raising the cyclicality of 
the deficit. To some extent this is also reflected in the Maastricht Treaty, with 
Article 104(c) noting that deficits may exceed the reference value if the excess 
is ‘only exceptional or temporary’, or if ‘the ratio has declined substantially and 
continuously’ and is reaching the reference value. However, it is not yet clear 
how this will be interpreted in practice if a downturn persists for some time. 
One possibility might be to calculate cyclically-adjusted fiscal deficits, although 
such estimates are likely to prove extremely sensitive both to the method of 
calculation of the level of output that might be expected if the economy were 
on trend and to the sensitivity of revenues and expenditure to the cycle, as is 
shown in Barrell et al. (1994).
This issue is one of the factors which leads Eichengreen (1992) to argue that the 
Maastricht criteria may not provide particularly useful information about a 
government whose current reputation is ‘good’, even though they will enable 
markets to assess whether profligate governments are becoming disciplined. 
Governments with a history of sound public finances could afford to temporarily 
run deficits in excess of 3 per cent of GDP in a cyclical downturn, without 
violating the debt criterion in the Treaty. Governments with a history of 
profligacy might find it more difficult to account for a related increase in their 
deficits. However, this view is unlikely to be accepted by all national authorities. 
The 1995 annual report of the Bundesbank suggests that the debt and deficit 
reference values should be treated as absolute ceilings rather than target figures 
if budgetary discipline is to be exerted in full. One implication of this position 
is that countries should be aiming for budget deficits well under 3 per cent of 
GDP by 1999, since, on our forecasts at least, a cyclical peak is projected to 
occur in the European economy around then.
A rigid pursuit of the ‘golden rule’ objective is hampered by the difficulties in 




























































































government accounts. Furthermore, governments may not directly appropriate 
the full social or financial returns from capital projects and hence revenues may 
not rise to offset the increased financial costs incurred from increased borrowing. 
There is also little reason why governments should be prevented from borrowing 
to finance current expenditure, if it were felt equitable to spread the costs of 
particular current programmes across several generations of taxpayers. German 
unification and its associated costs are an example of this, although even here 
the extra debt incurred is partly offset by the value of the assets owned by the 
former East German administration.
There are a number of criticisms that have been made about the definition of 
public indebtedness adopted in the Maastricht Treaty. Buiter el al. (1993) 
criticise the treaty both for focusing on the gross debt of the general government 
sector rather than the net debt, and for neglecting the impact of inflation. The 
outstanding level of gross debt can be very different from the level of the net 
debt, since the former includes the monetary base and does not take account of 
gross financial assets. For example, in 1990, gross debt in the Netherlands was 
equivalent to 78 per cent of GDP compared with net debt of 59 per cent, largely 
as a result of the significant assets held by the funded public sector pension 
scheme. A focus on gross debt offers scope for fulfilling the fiscal criteria 
through portfolio reallocation, either through the sale of financial assets or 
through the sale of capital assets via privatisation. In neither case is there any 
change in either net indebtedness or in long-term solvency.
Inflation can also have an important impact on the sustainability of any fiscal 
position. Countries with high levels of anticipated inflation will be paying a 
significant amount of nominal interest which will be cancelled out by a 
corresponding reduction in the real value of the debt stock. Other things being 
equal, they can undertake a higher level of borrowing whilst maintaining a given 
debt to GDP ratio. Similarly, countries with higher trend growth rates can safely 
run higher deficits, as their debt to GDP ratio will be stabilised through faster 
economic growth. These questions are particularly relevant to some of the 
southern European member states, who can be expected to experience faster 
growth rates and higher measured inflation as a result of structural change than 
northern European states. Of course, in practice, the inflation and long-term 
interest rate criteria in the Maastricht Treaty, together with the objectives of a 
European Central Bank, may limit the extent to which the optimal inflation- 
adjusted deficit can differ from the reference values.
A further alternative to the use of gross debt would be to focus on the overall 
net worth of the public sector, as suggested by Pain et al. (1994), with account 




























































































as well as the impact of anticipated inflation on the debt burden and depreciation 
on the capital stock. Properly defined, the net worth of the public sector would 
include both the public sector’s claim over natural resources as well as future 
liabilities such as pension commitments. The New Zealand government has 
already begun to utilise such an indicator in the fiscal process. Hills (1989) 
provides some illustrative estimates of the balance sheet of the UK public sector. 
Equivalent estimates have yet to be developed for many other EU members, 
although Van den Noord and Herd (1993) present estimates of the net present 
value of unfunded future pension liabilities. This policy can be viewed as a stock 
counterpart to the ‘golden rule’. Again, it is quite possible that particular fiscal 
stances which appear either unduly restrictive or profligate, may in fact be 
consistent with the maintenance of the net worth of the public sector when set 
against other developments that affect the balance sheet of the public sector but 
not the actual financial deficit. Whilst we do not pursue this issue further in this 
paper, we consider the development of balance sheet estimates for all the EU 
members to be a matter of considerable importance in order that fiscal trends 
within the EU might be viewed with a clearer long-term perspective.
The Need For Supranational Rules
The second area of debate surrounding the fiscal criteria is about the need for 
supranational rules. An alternative to the use of common reference values would 
be to allow member states to pursue their own national policies, provided such 
policies could be shown to ensure that their own solvency was maintained. The 
literature suggests that there are a number of pertinent reasons for the imposition 
of common reference values. Economic integration will increase the externalities 
of national fiscal decisions. In principle, the formation of a monetary union may 
encourage national governments to raise borrowing to unsustainable levels, 
possibly even to levels that threaten the stability of the union as a whole, by 
initially reducing the marginal cost of borrowing in member states which 
traditionally had high and variable inflation and a fluctuating and depreciating 
exchange rate. Investors in such countries would no longer require interest 
premia to cover these risks, and hence interest rates could well fall rather more 
than inflation. Ultimately, however, the reduction in the risk premium may be 
offset by a perceived rise in the possibility of eventual default. If so, costly 
pecuniary externalities can arise in the absence of fiscal rules. First, if capital is 
mobile and capital markets require higher (real) interest rates, deficit spending 
that drives up interest rates at home will also do so abroad (Canzoneri and Diba, 
1991), with possible adverse distributional consequences. Second, national 
governments may have a belief that in the event of their insolvency they would 
be ‘bailed-out’, either through other member states taking responsibility for their 




























































































authority. Concern about these possibilities is reflected in the Maastricht Treaty, 
with Articles 104-104b asserting that neither the Community nor member states 
would be liable for the commitments of particular governments, and preventing 
the European Central Bank (ECB) from either granting direct overdraft facilities 
or directly purchasing the debt of member states.
The rules governing fiscal debt and deficit ratios, together with the provision for 
the imposition of financial penalties if they are deemed to be unacceptably 
exceeded by the European Commission, can thus be viewed as necessary in 
order to prevent financial instability. Eichengreen (1992) demonstrates that the 
balanced budget amendments affecting many state governments in the United 
States have a significant impact on state bond yields, reducing the cost of 
borrowing. Bean (1992) suggests an alternative form of fiscal discipline, with 
national payments to the Community budget being made dependent on national 
debt and deficit levels in an appropriate manner. However, such an approach 
could involve the use of additional rules which may be as arbitrary as the 
Maastricht ones.
An additional issue which could also give rise to the need for EU-wide fiscal 
rules is the perceived need for rules over particular budgetary items, especially 
tax harmonisation, in order to prevent excessive fiscal competition. It is likely 
that harmonisation of indirect taxes would have some additional economic 
effects to those from simply meeting the Maastricht criteria, see for example 
Roberti and Visaggio (1994), although we do not seek to quantify the effects in 
this study.
The Economic Impact of the Fiscal Criteria
A number of earlier studies have attempted to quantify the effects on output and 
employment of fiscal policy changes, and in particular from meeting the 
Maastricht criteria. In general their findings largely depend on two factors, the 
baseline projection and the monetary policy response to any change in fiscal 
policy. A tighter fiscal stance throughout the Union may be expected to reduce 
real interest rates everywhere (Correia-Nunes and Stemitsiotis, 1995). 
Additionally, countries which have to take new measures to tighten fiscal policy 
to meet the Maastricht criteria may experience lower interest rates if the risk 
premia on their debt declines. It is generally accepted that if risk-adjusted 
interest rates are lower than had previously been expected, and if interest rates 
remain unchanged elsewhere, the exchange rate will initially depreciate, in line 
with the implications of theoretical models with forward-looking financial 
markets and sticky wages and prices, as in Dombusch (1976). This relaxation 




























































































the tighter fiscal stance. Studies that allow for the full effects of monetary policy 
have typically found a smaller impact on output than more traditional Keynesian 
studies that only partially acknowledge these effects. Eichengreen (1992, pg.28) 
cites a number of studies in which the monetary policy effects are found to 
dominate any fiscal spillovers.
Estimates of the impact of the Maastricht criteria are sensitive to the baseline 
projections that underlie the analysis, since these determine the extent to which 
policy needs to be changed to meet the criteria. For example, the projections 
made in OFCE (1993) at the trough of the recession, suggested that only 
Portugal and Luxembourg would meet the fiscal criteria by 1999. The OFCE 
estimated that public expenditure would have to fall by over 10 per cent per 
annum in some countries if they were to meet the deficit criteria by 1999. More 
recent projections, including our own discussed elsewhere in this report, suggest 
that the OFCE outlook may have been unduly pessimistic, with the European 
cyclical downturn having proved to be more attenuated than that in the early 
1980s, and countries such as Germany, France and the UK having taken action 
to return their public finances towards their long-standing objectives.
The OFCE study suggested that the additional measures required to achieve the 
deficit criteria by 1999 would reduce EU output by 0.65 per cent with the 
biggest losses arising in Spain, Greece, Italy and the UK. The measures required 
to meet the debt target would reduce EC-wide GDP by 2 per cent by 1999, with 
output falling by 5 per cent in Italy and Belgium. The effects of the application 
of the Maastricht criteria in the OFCE study are large, in part because of the 
pessimistic baseline, but also because the offsetting effects from interest rates 
and exchange rates that might be expected are not fully taken into account.
Large output effects are also reported by Roberti and Visaggio (1994), who use 
simulations on the DRI model to examine the effects on Italy of meeting the 
fiscal criteria. They conclude that it would be possible for Italy to meet the 
deficit criteria, particularly if the aim was to do so by 1999. However, this 
would still leave the debt to GDP ratio at well over 100 per cent. Any attempt 
to run a large fiscal surplus in order to meet the debt target by 1999, would 
result in a severe and prolonged recession, with output growth over 1992-99 
averaging around -1 per cent per annum.
Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993) summarise the findings of two earlier studies 
by Giovannini and McKibbin and the IMF that assessed the effects of meeting 
the Maastricht criteria by 1996. Giovannini and McKibbin used the MSG model, 
with the 1991 deficit to GDP ratios projected into the future. The policy stance 




























































































effects were again found to be larger in Italy than elsewhere, with output there 
initially falling by 11 per cent relative to base, but recovering to be 1 per cent 
below base by 1996. The main cause of this large output fall was the reduction 
in inflation to German levels, and the consequent rise in real interest rates, rather 
than the fiscal criteria themselves. The effects on other countries were more 
modest, with Germany experiencing a mild recession.
The IMF study used a baseline projection in which primary deficit to GDP ratios 
were held at their 1992 levels, and examined two possible scenarios for 
convergence of deficit and inflation rates by 1996. The first scenario assumed 
that interest differentials between Germany and other EU members were reduced 
as convergence occurs. The second simply assumed that interest rate differentials 
persisted at their 1992 levels. The cumulative output loss in the second scenario 
was around twice that in the first, again serving to highlight the importance of 
the monetary policy response to fiscal contractions.
Englander and Egebo (1993) report a number of fiscal simulations on a modified 
version of the OECD’s INTERLINK model, taking 1992 projections as the 
reference scenario. Their results point to the possibility of asymmetric responses 
within Europe, reflecting differences in national wage and price flexibility. A 
reduction in fiscal deficits equivalent to 1 per cent of GDP is found to result in 
a cumulative output loss of 0.2 per cent of GDP over a 5 year period in 
Germany, but 1.65 per cent in a weighted average of France, the UK, Italy and 
Spain. A more recent version of the OECD model is described in Richardson et 
al. (1994). Their simulation results illustrate that a sustained rise in final 
government expenditure of 1 per cent of GDP will raise European output by 3.5 
per cent after 6 years if nominal interest rates remain fixed. However, if interest 
rates respond, so as to maintain low inflation, then the additional expenditure 
will be crowded-out completely. The implications of this study can be reversed, 
and the implications for a fiscal contraction drawn. It should also be 
remembered that ‘fixed nominal interest rates’ is a diagnostic convenience for 
a modeller, not a permanent policy option available to the authorities.
Several recent studies have drawn on the work of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) 
and have looked for the possibility of “expansionary fiscal contractions”. It is 
claimed that a fiscal contraction can raise demand through various “non- 
Keynesian” routes. In a forward-looking world, a smaller fiscal deficit with a 
constant money target will lead to a decline in long-term interest rates and a 
depreciation of the exchange rate. This follows from the effect of the money 
target on short-term interest rates, which fall in every period. Hence rational 
financial market operators react, and long rates fall. The effect of lower long 




























































































depreciation on net exports. We would expect these effects to partially offset the 
contractionary effects of the fiscal policy (and in a very small open economy 
they could completely offset them). Giavazzi and Pagano (1990 and 1995) go 
further. They suggest that consumers react positively to the prospect of 
permanently lower taxes, and raise their consumption. Bayar, Dramais, in’t Veld 
and Roger (1996) and McDermott and Westcott (1996) suggest that 
expansionary fiscal contractions, due to a combination of the positive investment 
and consumption responses, may have been observed in Ireland, Denmark, 
Sweden and Norway in the 1980s. Whilst not denying the theoretical possibility 
of such events we do not believe that they offer a useful guide to assessing the 
economic impact of large fiscal contractions in the major European economies. 
Moreover even if fiscal contractions have expansionary effects on output, they 
may still lead to lower levels of employment in the short run if labour markets 
adjust slowly (Barry and Devereux (1995)).
III. The European Economies on NiGEM
Any analysis of the effects of the Maastricht fiscal criteria must be set in the 
context of a conception of the workings of the European economy. The work we 
have undertaken is based on the global econometric model, NiGEM. NiGEM is 
an estimated model which uses a ‘New-Keynesian’ framework, in that there is 
a significant role for active fiscal and monetary policies to help cope with 
deviations from equilibrium employment. Such policies can be used to ensure 
that sustainable employment is achieved more quickly. However, we do not 
believe that active fiscal and monetary policy can be used to change the level 
of output and employment permanently. There are policies that can be used to 
achieve these ends, but they involve more direct intervention in the workings of 
the market. These are not considered in this paper, but it is clear that longer 
term improvements in education, training and in the functioning of labour 
markets are essential.
The theoretical structure and the relevant simulation properties of NiGEM are 
described in Barrel!, Sefton and in’t Veld (1993), Barrell and Sefton (1996) and 
in NIESR (1996). The model contains estimated structures for the whole world, 
with the major economies having 60-90 equation models with around 20 key 
behavioural equations. Each country model has a consumption function that 
depends on income and wealth, investment equations, a set of export and import 
price and volume equations, a labour market with a long run sustainable level 
of unemployment embedded in it, and a set of relationships that determine 




























































































complete descriptions of the government sectors. Government debt is issued to 
finance the deficit, net of the money issue, and taxes affect expenditure.
Financial Markets
There are a number of important features in the version of NiGEM used for the 
policy analyses in this report.
We assume, at least for the relevant period, that the ERM, 
including the UK and Italy, is in place, that the Bundesbank leads 
the ERM, and that German monetary policy determines interest 
rates in Europe. The US, Japan and Canada follow their own 
monetary targets. This avoids the complications of a switch in 
monetary regimes in the middle of a simulation.
Financial markets are forward looking. If an announcement is made 
that suggests that policy will change in the future, then markets 
react immediately. Movements in exchange rates and long-term 
interest rates reflect expectations of the future path of short-term 
interest rates. Equity prices respond to changes in long term interest 
rates and the model returns to asset equilibrium.
All expectations are model-consistent, in that we assume financial market 
operators in the model have expectations that are consistent with the eventual 
outturns of the model. These features of the financial markets are important 
when comparing results across models, and they are, for instance, absent in 
many models, including those used by the European Commission and the 
OECD.
Labour Markets
Another key area of NiGEM is the modelling of national labour markets, with 
the setting of wages being closely connected to the determination of the level of 
employment. A general characterisation of our empirical approach is that a 
bargain between social partners determines the real wage, with employers setting 





























































































There are important institutional differences between national labour markets, 
particularly in the degree of forward-looking behaviour, that affect the flexibility 
of the real wage. We find that reaction speeds can vary greatly in different 
countries, although they are generally slow. In some countries, such as France 
and the UK, the bargain is over the expected real wage. In others, such as Spain 
and Italy, automatic indexation clauses have in the past been included in the 
bargain. However, these have now been removed: as a result the wage bargain 
has become more forward-looking in these countries. In contrast, Germany and 
the Netherlands (and Belgium) have been much more successful in combating 
inflation and bargainers appear to be willing (or are constrained) to accept 
compensation for past inflation only. Differences such as these mean that, at 
least while the ERM is in operation, a similar increase in demand in all countries 
can have significantly different short-term effects on wage inflation.
The outcome of the wage bargain will ultimately depend upon factors such as 
the relative strength of unions and the level of unemployment benefit, as well 
as the level of unemployment.
The National Institute has undertaken a number of studies of sustainable 
unemployment in Europe. The estimates in Barrell, Pain and Young (1994) 
suggest that sustainable unemployment is around 8 per cent in France and the 
UK, and 7 per cent in Germany. Once countries with a history of higher 
unemployment are taken into account, such as Spain and Italy, it is likely that 
sustainable unemployment in the EU as a whole is currently rather higher than 
this, possibly somewhere between 9 and 10 percent. When unemployment is 
above the sustainable level it puts downward pressure on wages, and 
employment will rise. However the process of adjustment is lengthy. The 
projections described above suggest that unemployment in many continental 
European countries will not reach its long-run level until the end of the century. 
The reasons for the rise in sustainable unemployment in Europe since the 1960s 
have been extensively discussed, with much of the relevant work covered in 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991).
The characteristics of European labour markets have an important role to play 
in determining the employment effects of changes in fiscal policy. Key features 
of our labour demand and wage equations are reported in Table 1. The first 
column reports the substitutability of capital for labour, and the second gives a 
measure of the speed of response of employment to a change in wages. Both 
these factors have an important bearing on the employment consequences of 
fiscal shocks. For example, a fiscal expansion that raised aggregate demand and 
reduced unemployment would put upward pressure on wages. If firms could 




























































































This relative factor price effect would tend to offset the rise in employment 
initially generated by the increase in aggregate demand. If substitutability is low, 
then this offsetting effect would be less significant. Response speeds are also 
important. If substitutability was high, but the speed of response slow, then the 
offsetting employment effect would again be felt only gradually.

















Belgium -0.53 17.23 -0.9
r-noo
Denmark -0.34 5.63 -0.9 8.00
Finland -0.38 5.53 -1.7 10.45
France -0.65 7.40 -1.4 -------------- ÏT 4 T
Germany -0.30 6.50 -4.1 8.30
Greece -0.40 19.72 -3.0 3.26
Ireland -0.66 4.20 -1.2 12.43
Italy -0.81 I9Ü" K W
Netherlands -0.53 17.23 -0.8 9.61
Portugal -0.69 0.99 -2.0 4.49
Spain -1.00 5301 -0.8 6.40
Sweden 307TT 6.16 -1.8 7.98
UK -0.36 3.71 -0.4 3.88
Notes: (1) Elasticity o f substitution between capital and labour. (2) Mean lag in response o f labour 
demand to a change in wages. (3) Percentage change in wages in response to a 1 percentage point 
change in unemployment. (4) Mean lag in response o f wages to a change in unemployment.
It is clear from the table that there are considerable differences between the 
European economies. Italy and Sweden make an interesting comparison in this 
respect as both would have to undertake significant fiscal contractions to meet 
the criteria in the Maastricht Treaty. Italy has a high degree of substitutability 
of 0.81 and a response speed of one year. Therefore any fiscal contraction 
which reduced aggregate demand, employment and wages would be expected 
to generate some substitution back into labour, offsetting some of the initial, 
demand driven, fall in employment. In Sweden the estimated degree of 
substitutability is much lower, at 0.27, so the scope for offsetting employment 




























































































The labour demand relationship describes only one side of the labour market. 
The last two columns of Table 1 describe some of the characteristics of the 
wage equations used in the model. The third column shows the effect of 
unemployment on wages. A value of -2 would imply that a 1 percentage point 
rise in unemployment would lead to a 2 per cent fall in real wages. The effect 
of unemployment on wages varies considerably from -0.4 in the UK to -4.1 
in Germany. In the fourth column we report a measure of the speed of 
response of wages to a change in unemployment; this also shows considerable 
variation. The UK and Germany experience one of the fastest responses whilst 
Finland, France, Ireland, and the Netherlands are much slower, perhaps 
reflecting the nature of the bargaining process.
Other studies (e.g. Layard et al. (1991), OECD (1995)) have found differing 
values for the effect of unemployment on wages and some differences in the 
relative position of these countries but a number of common threads can be 
found. Typically unemployment is found to have only a limited effect on 
wages in Spain. Morgan (1996) links this to the combination of stringent 
employment protection for permanent workers with the prevalence of 
temporary employment (around a third of total employment). In contrast, the 
effect of unemployment on wages in Germany tends to be much higher due 
to the nature of German industrial relations. Our analyses of labour markets 
have attempted to take account of endemic structural change in Europe. 
Anderton and Barrell (1995) found evidence for change in wage bargaining 
in several EU economies. In particular, Italian wage bargaining changed in the 
1980s as the ‘Scala Mobile’ system of automatic indexing was dismantled. 
Barrell, Pain and Young (1996) present some evidence of changes in German 
labour markets in the 1990s, with a structural break in labour demand after 
unification. This work is extended in Morgan (1996a and 1996b), who reports 
structural changes in labour demand in Germany, and wage bargaining 
frameworks in Germany, Italy and Spain. We incorporate these structural 
changes in our analysis below, as we wish to use a model that represents 
behaviour of the 1990s, not the 1980s. Obviously we cannot easily predict 
future structural changes, but we have done our best to address the Lucas 
critique by constructing a stable, structural model, which includes forward- 
looking behaviour.
Fiscal Multipliers
The impact of any change in fiscal policy depends on the characteristics of 
the economy and on the monetary policy responses of the relevant authorities. 
The relationship between fiscal policy changes and the overall level of output 




























































































would indicate that a 1 per cent of GDP rise in government spending now 
would raise GDP by 1 per cent in five years time.
A key feature of NiGEM is the use of tax rules to ensure that in the long run 
governments remain solvent (Barrell, 1994). These rules ensure that the 
budget deficit and the debt stock return to sustainable levels after any change 
in spending. Their importance to the solution of theoretically coherent rational 
expectations models is discussed at length in Barrell and Sefton (1996). If the 
analysis of any policy change is based on the assumption that the fiscal deficit 
and debt targets are unchanged in the long run, then a fiscal expansion now 
has to be offset by an increase in taxes and a fiscal contraction in the future. 
Table 2 gives details of the fiscal multipliers on NiGEM when the fiscal 
solvency rules are in place. After five years these multipliers are much lower 
than those in Whitely (1992, Table 5.1), when such rules are not in place.
Fiscal multipliers are generally small within Europe, in part because of trade 
integration. Europe is more dependent on external trade than some other large 
trading regions. Openness has been increasing over time, and hence estimated 
fiscal multipliers have fallen, with more demand being met through imports 
from outside the EU. A European-wide fiscal expansion raises output in each 
country by more than the increase when one country expands on its own. For 
instance, in Germany the first year effects of a 1 per cent of GDP fiscal 
expansion involve an increase in output of 0.75 per cent, whilst a European­
wide expansion raises output by almost 1 per cent in the first year. The 
increase in the effect is even greater in the Netherlands and Belgium, where 
a fiscal expansion raises GDP by around 0.5 per cent when they act alone, but 
by a full 1 per cent when Europe acts in concert. This reflects their very 
open nature, with large proportions of output being destined for imports. 
However, these beneficial effects from concerted action are not necessarily 
universal. A fiscal expansion leads to higher interest rates and a higher real 
exchange rate, at least in the short run. Both have more of an effect on the 
UK than on other European economies, in part because it has a stronger 
orientation in trade to non-European markets. The UK also appears to be 
more responsive to increases in interest rates, with consumption being directly 
affected because of the mortgage finance system. As a result, output in the 
UK in the first year of an expansion rises by the same amount in both 
scenarios, and it is lower in the second year, when a concerted expansion 




























































































Tabic 2. Table of Fiscal Multipliers in Large European Countries
EMU with Expansion in 
named Country
EMU with Expansion in al! 
Countries
1 2 J 10 1 2 5 10
Germany GDP 0.76 0.46 0.09 -0.22 0.93 0.54 0.07 -0.28
Prices -0.03 0.11 0.75 0.48 -0.04 0.14 0.91 0.58
France GDP 0.51 0.54 0.11 -0.14 0.58 0.62 0.15 -0.21
Prices 0.01 0.15 0.70 0.50 0.00 0.16 0.90 0.91
UK GDP 0.62 0.47 0.11 -0.20 0.64 0.37 -0.09 -0.27
Prices 0.05 0.22 0.67 0.21 0.02 0.18 0.51 0.06
Italy GDP 0.45 0.46 0.15 -0.04 0.59 0.61 0.24 -0.07
Prices 0.03 0.15 0'.39 0.34 0.02 0.19 0.59 0.72
Spain GDP 0.80 0.64 0.06 -0.19 0.94 0.78 0.17 -0.21
Prices 0.01 0.10 0.53 0.33 0.00 0.11 0.66 0.58
Netherlands GDP 0.60 0.53 0.53 0.41 0.99 0.90 0.46 0.03
Prices 0.01 0.09 0.46 1.13 0.01 0.13 0.70 1.26
Belgium GDP 0.53 0.41 0.41 0.37 0. 98 0.72 0.44 0.09
Prices -0.13 -0.08 0.11 0.38 -0.29 -0.20 0.32 0.89
ECU -1.19 -0.99 -0.42 0.22
Short-rate 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.13
Long-rate 0.22 0.21 0.14 0.05
Note: Numbers indicate the percentage change following a 1% o f GDP rise in government 
consumption with the fiscal solvency rule in place.
IV. Prospects For The European Economy
Judgements about the prospects for monetary union and the fiscal measures 
required to achieve this goal are predicated on economic projections. Such 
projections provide a means of assessing the eventual impact of the present 
policy stance once the European economies have returned to a trend level of 
activity (Blanchard et al., 1990). The baseline forecasts used in this paper are 
those described in the February 1996 edition of the National Institute 
Economic Review, augmented by projections for some of the smaller 
European economies. Table 3 summarises the baseline outlook for economic 
growth for the period 1996-2003 for the EU as a whole, and the seven largest 
EU economies. Overall, it was expected that growth would be below trend in 





























































































Table 3. Prospects for Europe 
GDP (percentage growth per annum)
EU Germany France Italy UK Spain Neths Belgiu
1996 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.6 3.3 2.2 2.0
1997 2.8 16 2.6 2.5 3.3 2.7 2.4 2.4
1998 2.8 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.6
1999-2003 2.7 2.5 2.4 3.1 2.5 2.6 3.1 2.6
Our assessment of the prospects of the major European economies satisfying 
the Maastricht convergence criteria is shown in Table 4. These projections 
take into account the announced future fiscal plans of the respective national 
governments available at the time that the baseline was constructed. If growth 
were to be significantly slower than we expect then the prospects for public 
finances are likely to worsen as tax revenues are lower and social security 
expenditure higher than we predict. Hence further measures would be required 
to meet the fiscal criteria and the associated employment and output affects 
in the simulations below would be correspondingly higher.
Although many countries are not expected to satisfy the convergence criteria 
fully by 1997, we still regard the baseline as being one which would permit 
a (limited) monetary union to be formed in 1999. We expect that it will be 
possible to produce plausible projections in 1997 which would show a number 
of countries meeting the criteria for government deficits and inflation by 
1999. The two large countries which appear least likely to be eligible for 
membership of a monetary union are Italy and Spain, with our projections 
indicating that neither country may in fact meet any of the criteria. Other 




























































































Table 4. Convergence and monetary union in Europe
G overnm ent deficits: p e r  cen t o f  GDP(a)
T a rg e t G erm an y F rance Italy UK Spain Neths Belgium
1992 -2.9 -4.0 -9.5 -5.0 -4.1 -3.9 -7.5
1993 -3.3 -6.1 -9.6 -6.9 -7.4 -3.2 -7.1
1994 -2.7 -6.0 -9.0 -6.6 -6.6 -3.2 -5.7
1995(b) -3.0 -3.6 -5.2 -7.8 -5.4 -5.5 -3.5 -4.7
1996 -3.0 -3.4 -4.1 -6.5 -3.7 -5.6 -2.8 -3.7
1997 -3.0 -3.2 -3.5 -6.2 -2.8 -4.9 -2.4 -3.1
1998 -3.0 -2.7 -3.0 -6.3 -1.8 -4.1 -2.2 -2.5
1999 -3.0 -2.1 -2.8 -5.8 -1.0 -3.4 -2.1 -2.1
Government debts: per cent o f  GDP(c)
T a rg e t G erm an y F ran ce Italy UK Spain N eths Belgium
1992 40.6 43.3 112.2 44.0 52.0 77.8 135.7
1993 45.6 49.7 116.5 51.8 60.9 79.5 143.4
1994 48.5 53.0 119.3 53.5 65.7 78.3 143.2
1995(b) 60.0 61.4 55.7 119.4 52.0 72.2 79.5 145.4
1996 60.0 62.6 57.1 116.8 51.5 72.7 79.3 143.5
1997 60.0 62.2 57.7 114.9 50.9 72.5 78.5 140.3
1998 60.0 61.9 58.1 112.7 49.4 71.5 77.5 136.4
1999 60.0 61.3 58.4 110.0 47.2 69.6 76.4 132.2
2000-02 60.0 59.2 58.4 102.3 42.9 63.6 73.4 122.9
Government debts: Difference between Maastricht Definition and the OECD measure (d)
G e rm a n y F ran ce Italy UK Spain N eths Belgium
1994 1.7 -4.7 6.1 -3.4 -2.7 -0.3 -8.2
Inflation Criterion: per cent (e)
T a rg e t(f) G erm an y F rance Ita ly UK Spain N eths Belgium
1992 4.7 2.4 5.5 4.7 6.4 3.0 2.4
1993 4.0 2.2 4.8 3.5 5.6 2.1 2.7
1994 2.8 1.8 4.7 2.5 5.1 2.1 2.4
1995(b) 3.4 L 2 1.8 5.2 2.7 4.6 1.9 1.6
1996 3.6 2 J . 2.4 5.2 2.8 4.0 1.9 2.0
1997 3.6 2.0 1 1 4.5 3.4 4.3 1.8 2.2
1998 3.6 1.8 1 1 4.4 3.6 4.4 1.5 2.2
1999 3.6 1.6 1 1 4.5 3.6 4.6 1.4 2.2
Notes: (a) General government borrowing requirement. The government deficit to GDP ratio should 
not exceed 3 per cent and the government debt to GDP ration should not exceed 60 per cent unless 
the excess is either exceptional and temporary, or unless the ratio is declining toward the target 
level at a satisfactory pace, (b) Figures from 1995 are forecast figures, (c) Gross debt, using the 
standardised OECD definitions, (d) Amount by which the debt stock calculated on the definition 
used in the Maastricht Treaty exceeds the standard OECD definition in 1994. (e) Consumers 
expenditure deflator. To meet the Maastricht convergence criteria, each country must have a 
sustainable price performance which means that its consumer price inflation rate must not exceed 
that o f at most the three best performing states fin terms o f price stability) by more than 1.5 per 
cent in the last year, (e) Calculated from the major seven. The inclusion o f Austria, Denmark and 




























































































The Netherlands is expected to meet all the criteria apart from the debt limit 
of 60 per cent. However, there would be a strong case for allowing the 
Netherlands to join with a debt stock of a little over 70 per cent as it is placed 
at a particular disadvantage by the focus on gross rather than net debt. 
Belgium would also fail the debt criteria as it has a debt stock well over 100 
per cent, but it could argue that it was making sufficient progress towards 
reducing it. Alternatively, it should qualify for entry in the early part of the 
next century. It is clear, however, from both Commission statements and the 
‘Excessive Deficit’ procedure, that countries making ‘sufficient progress’ in 
their reduction of debt would be rewarded. For instances, in May 1996 the 
Commission made Excessive Deficit rulings for all countries, and only 
Ireland, Luxembourg and Denmark were exempted. Although Ireland has a 
debt stock well in excess of 60 per cent of GDP, because its fiscal deficit has 
been under 3 per cent of GDP for some time, it was considered to be making 
sufficient progress. Similar leeway could easily be given to the Netherlands 
and Belgium by the turn of the century, but this would require that they 
reduce their deficits to below 3 per cent of GDP1.
In a number of cases the projected national deficits are actually smaller than 
those achieved over the comparable period of 1984-89 when there was last a 
sustained economic upturn in Europe. For example, the average deficit in Italy 
over that period was 11.2 per cent, compared to an implied average of 6.9 per 
cent between 1994-99 on our baseline.
V. The Impact of Meeting the Maastricht Fiscal Criteria
Our forecast baseline is one in which the majority of the EU countries achieve 
a fiscal policy compatible with the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty by 
1999, and hence there is less additional fiscal consolidation that needs to be 
undertaken than might be expected given the budgetary positions at the end 
of 1995. In this section we analyse the impact of the adjustments required to 
ensure that all countries satisfy the deficit and debt criteria, the fortner by 
1999 and the latter by 2002. In each case we report the impact on 
employment in each member state, along with the changes in EU-wide output,
' If the deficit criteria is achieved and nominal GDP is growing at 5 per cent per annum 
or more, then eventually the debt stock target is approached, however high the starting value 




























































































inflation and interest rates. In both scenarios, the fiscal contractions reduce 
nominal GDP growth, and hence increase the difficulties involved in 
achieving the required targets. We also evaluate these policies in the light of 
the discussion in section III.
Targeting Budgets
On our baseline, four countries fail to meet the deficit criterion by 1999. Italy, 
Greece, and Sweden need to tighten their fiscal policy significantly in order 
to meet the deficit criteria by 1999, whilst a much smaller tightening is 
required in Spain. We assume that this is achieved through a mixture of 
higher direct taxation and an immediate cut in the level of government 
expenditure, with the long run burden being evenly shared between them. The 
taxation component of the consolidation programme is assumed to be 
gradually implemented in order that the possibility of a sharp recession is 
reduced. Given our assumptions about monetary policy during the transition 
to EMU, the fiscal contraction is accompanied by a fall in European interest 
rates and a depreciation in the exchange rate of the European economies 
against the dollar2.
On our baseline the Italian government has an average deficit of 6.5 per cent 
of GDP between 1996 and 1999. The measures required to achieve the deficit 
target by 1999 imply an average deficit of 4 per cent in those years. As a 
result, output growth would be 0.4 per cent a year slower than on our 
baseline, and a considerable amount of unemployment will be generated, as 
can be seen horn Table 5. By the year 2000, employment would be some 
160,000 less than in our baseline, raising the unemployment rate by 0.7 per 
cent. Thereafter employment slowly returns to where it would otherwise have 
been. The effects of achieving the deficit criteria are significantly greater in 
Greece and Sweden than they are in Italy. The average government deficit 
between 1996 and 1999 would have to be reduced by around 3 per cent of 
GDP in Sweden, and 4 per cent in Greece. Average output growth would fall 
from 2.5 per cent a year in Sweden to around 1.8 percent, and it would fall 
from 2.5 per cent a year to around zero in Greece. Significant output gaps 
would emerge, and in 1999 the unemployment rate in Sweden and Greece





























































































would have risen above our baseline by some 2 percentage points and 3 
percentage points respectively.
Table 5. Targeting Budgets. Unemployment and Output
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Unemployment(a)
Austria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.10
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.07
Denmark 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.13 5TÌ9 ÔTT
Finland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08
France 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 ÔÜ5 0.05
Germany -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.09
Greece 0.60 1.81 2.76 3.34 3.59 3.60 3.41
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Italy 0.01 0.11 0.34 0.57 0.69 0.68 0.55
Netherlands 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.09
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Spain 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.12 0.17 0.04
Sweden 0.14 0.71 1.49 2.14 2.49 2.54 2.35
UK 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
EU Total 0.02 0.08 0.16 0.24 0.30 0.31 0.28
EU GDP(b) 0.01 -0.06 -0.19 -0.32 -Ó.4 -Ô.41 -0.34
EU Inflation(c) 0.01 0 -0.02 -0.06 -0.1 -0.13 -0.14
Short-term rates(c) 0 0.01 0.01 0 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05
Long-term rates(c) 0 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
Ecu/$ rate(bl 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.29
(a) effects on unemployment as a percentage o f the labour force, (b) per cent deviation from base, 
(c) percentage point deviation from base.
The effects elsewhere are noticeable, with EU GDP declining by 0.4 per cent 
from base by the end of the decade, although overall employment falls by 
only around a half a million. Some countries benefit because they are affected 
more by lower interest rates and a lower exchange rate than they are by a 
reduction in demand in the three economies with a tighter policy. The UK for 
instance has slightly higher employment as a result of a tighter fiscal policy 
in the high deficit countries.
Even with a fiscal contraction on the scale shown it is unlikely that either 
Italy or Greece would be able to enter a monetary union in 1999, since both 
would continue to miss the required inflation ‘target’. Given the baseline 
projections, both would still have inflation well above the target level, with 




























































































and partially offset by the rise in import prices induced by currency 
depreciation. A monetary tightening, along with an initial appreciation of the 
currency, would be necessary if, say, Italy was to fulfil all the criteria, as the 
fiscal contraction alone only reduces inflation by 0.3 per cent in 1999. We 
have undertaken such an analysis by repeating the scenario in Table 6, adding 
a change in the money target in Italy, which is considered fully credible, to 
ensure that the inflation rate converges on that of Germany early in the next 
century. As a result, the Italian exchange rate initially rises by 9 per cent, and 
by the year 1999, inflation falls by just over 1.1 per cent as compared to our 
base, bringing it just inside the Maastricht target. The unemployment costs are 
significantly higher than those associated with the fiscal contraction above, 
with growth 0.5 per cent lower for five years, with most of the effect coming 
in the first year. On average, Italian unemployment would be 1 per cent 
higher between 1996 and 2000 than in Table 5.
These costs are high, but it might be considered that they are not excessive. 
We have argued in section II that countries with a high real growth rate, and 
higher measured inflation because of structural change, could have higher 
deficits and still achieve the debt stock target. In addition, the relative price 
changes, as associated with a changing structure.
Targeting Debt Stocks
Although our projections suggest that most countries will meet the deficit 
criteria by 1999, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Austria, Greece and 
Sweden fail to meet the debt stock criteria. We have undertaken an 
experiment where deficits are reduced sufficiently that they might be expected 
to reach the debt stock target by 2002. The debt target in the Maastricht 
Treaty allows countries to qualify for EMU if ‘...the (debt) ratio is declining 
toward the target level at a satisfactory pace'. If in 1999 a country’s public 
finances were on course to achieve a debt stock of 60 per cent of GDP in 
2002, this would certainly seem to satisfy the debt criterion. Indeed it could 
be argued that our interpretation of this criterion is unnecessarily restrictive 
for countries with very high debt stocks, most notably Belgium and Italy, who 
may be able to show satisfactory progress in 1999 without reducing their debt 
stocks to 60 per cent of GDP until later in the next century. Ultimately the 
decision on whether a country’s debt stock allows it to qualify for EMU will 




























































































Achieving the debt criterion is much more difficult than the deficit criterion 
because a significant contraction has to be in place for some years before its 
effects are felt. Once again we assume that the new targets are achieved by 
sharing the burden between spending and direct taxation, with the fiscal 
contraction generating a fall in interest rates and an initial currency 
depreciation. We argued in section II that the rationale for achieving the debt 
stock target quickly is weak, and that the deficit and debt stock targets are 
only consistent if nominal GDP growth is 5 per cent. We would argue that 
rapid achievement of the debt target is neither desirable nor likely.
Belgium has the largest distance to move, reflecting the size of their debt 
stock relative to GDP, although, given their prospective baseline fiscal 
deficits, Greece actually has to undertake the largest fiscal contraction. Italy 
would have to reduce its average deficit for 1996 to 1999 to 0.5 percent of 
GDP, Greece and Sweden would have to reduce their deficits by an average 
of 10 and 7 per cent of GDP per annum respectively. The required fiscal 
contraction in the Netherlands and Austria is much smaller than in the other 
four countries.
This concerted fiscal contraction would reduce employment in the Community 
by around 1.6 million by 2002 and thus raise the unemployment rate by 1.1 
percentage points as compared to our baseline. The unemployment rate in 
Italy would rise by 2.6 percentage points, whilst in Belgium it would be up 
by 2.5 percentage points, and in the Netherlands it would be 1.5 percentage 
points higher. The effects on Sweden and Greece are much larger, with 
unemployment rising by 6 per cent in the former and 7 per cent in the latter. 
These effects are large because Greece has to make such a sustained 
contraction, and Sweden has low inflation, making debt reduction more costly. 
Overall, GDP in the EU is some 2.6 per cent below our baseline by the year 
2000, although the reductions are concentrated in just a few countries. 
Average output growth over 1996 to 1999 would fall by 2.5 per cent in Italy, 
0.8 per cent in the Netherlands, and 1.7 per cent in Belgium. The reduction 
would be larger in Sweden, where average growth would fall from 2.5 per 
cent to only 0.7 per cent a year over the five year period. Output in Greece 
would fall by 2.5 per cent a year for five years rather than rise by a similar 
amount over the period, and inflation would fall from 8 per cent to 3 per cent. 
The costs of these adjustments cannot be seen as negligible, particularly in the 




























































































Table 6. Targeting Debt Stocks. Unemployment and Output
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Unemployment(a)
Austria -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.17 0.36 0.52
Belgium 0.19 0.84 1.45 1.90 2.22 2.40 2.48
Denmark 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.16 0.25 0.37 0.49
Finland 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.20 0.28
France 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.22
Germany 0.02 0.14 0.30 0.42 0.49 0.52 0.52
Greece 0.84 2.86 4.77 6.11 6.87 7.16 7.05
Ireland 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.20
Italy 0.57 2.10 3.35 3.80 3.66 3.21 2.63
Netherlands 0.03 0.22 0.56 0.89 1.16 1.36 1.47
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08
Spain 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.26 0.38 0.43 537
Sweden 0.30 1.45 3.09 4.60 5.61 K W 575J
UK -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.08
EU Total 0.12 0.48 0.84 1.06 1.15 1.14 1.05
EU GDP(b) -0.77 -1.74 -2.34 -2.6 -2.66 -2.58 -2.36
EU Inflation(c) 0.07 -0.16 -0.41 -0.61 -0.72 7Ü777 -0.77
Short-term rates(c) 51 -0.02 -0.08 -0.16 -Ô.24 -Ô.33 -0.47
Long-term rates(c) 0 -0.43 -Ô.5 -0.56 -0.59 -0.61 -0.6
Ecu/$ rate(b) 2.53 2.52 2.47 2.38 2.25 2.06 1.81
(a) effects on unemployment as a percentage o f the labour force, (b) per cent deviation from base, 
(c) percentage point deviation from base.
Returning To Past Behavior: Abandoning Maastricht
In order to evaluate the effects of the Maastricht fiscal conditions it is useful 
to undertake an analysis where the criteria are effectively removed and an 
alternative policy is pursued. We feel that it would be a mistake to choose 
some arbitrary level at which to set deficits, and that it would be wrong to 
ignore past behaviour. Our preferred alternative policy stance is one in which 
countries choose to pursue policies similar to those adopted across the 
previous cyclical expansion in the latter half of the 1980s.
Details of public sector deficits in Europe from 1984 to 1989 (before the 
temporarily beneficial effects of German unification) are given in Table 7, 
along with our own projections for 1994 to 1999. Some countries, such as the 
UK, France and Germany, had tighter fiscal policies in the 1980s than we are 
projecting for the 1990s, but even with this looser stance they are still 
expected to be well within the fiscal criteria. Hence we have not assumed that 
they would choose to pursue an alternative policy to the one shown in our 




























































































Greece, are assumed to pursue a looser policy, and they would adopt the 
average target from the late 1980s. It is of course not clear that this would be 
either sensible for them, or acceptable to the Bundesbank, if they wish to join 
a European Monetary Union. There may also be little political will in some 
of the countries to run higher deficits in future; we doubt if the Irish for 
instance would wish to change their present policy stance.
Table 7. Historical and Projected Deficits as a Percent of GDP
Average 1984-89 Average 1994-99
Austria -3.2 -4.0
Belgium -7.9 -3.6





Ireland -7.6 - 1.0






The reactions of financial markets to policy changes depend upon their view 
of the impact of the new policies and their expectation of the likely reaction 
of the monetary authorities. We assume that the Bundesbank would continue 
to target a fixed rate of inflation in Germany even in the face of stronger 
demand. As a result, the adoption of an expansionary fiscal policy is likely 
to be accompanied by an increase in interest rates and an initial currency 
appreciation. These monetary changes on their own are contractionary, but are 
eventually offset by the effects of the fiscal expansion.
However, the fiscal expansion is actually delayed; although policy is expected 
to be significantly more lax in Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece and Italy by 
1999 than on our base, there is little initial change in expenditure and taxes 
in these countries. As the monetary response is immediate, the initial impact 
of the announced change in fiscal policy reduces employment everywhere, 
although not by a large amount. As policy becomes more expansionary during 
the late 1990s, the unemployment rate in Italy falls by 1 percentage point by 
the turn of the century, and by around 0.5 of a percentage point in the Low 
Countries. There are also large effects in Ireland. These gains are transitory 
but sustained for several years. The overall impact on the Union is more 




























































































employment than on our baseline for several years in the UK, France and 
Germany, as can be seen from Table 8.
Table 8. Returning to Past Behaviour. Unemployment and Output Effects
1996 — rw7 — r o o s — T999— 2000 2ÜÏÏT— 200?
Unemployment(a)
Austria 0.00 0.03 p o 0.02 0 . Ô Ô -(3.02 75757
Belgium 0.00 -0.07 -0.19 -0.38 -0.57 -0.78 75753
Denmark 0.00 0750 0.(50 0.00 75751 -0.06 -0.12
Finland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04
France 0.00 0.00 075T 7575? 75755 75755 75757
Germany 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.13 -0.17 -0.22
Greece 0.00 0.00 0750 ” 7575? “ 7575? -0.12 -0.31
Ireland 0.00 -0.21 -0.76 -1.65 -2.40 -2.79 -2.78
Italy -0.02 -0.15 -0.46 7579 3753 -1.15 -1.21
Netherlands 0.00 -0.03 -0.13 -0.30 -0.51 -0.73 -0.97
Portugal 0.00 0755 0.02 -0.16 -0.31 -0.40 -0.41
Spain 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.11 -0.14
Sweden Ô . 0 0 07501 0.00 7575? 75757 -0.11 -0.18
UK 0.00 0.00 0.01
mp©
07541 0041 0.05
" 'ED Total ÎFÜ01 75750 75759 Ô -0.26 753? 7535
EU GDP(b) 0.03 0.16 0.39 0.61 o '-j 3C 0 3 ! 1.05
EU Intlation(c) 0.01 0751 0.06 0.13 0 7 5 03?
Short-term rates(c) 0 0 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.1 0.15
Long-term rates(c) 0 OT9 0.25 0.32 030 047 0.56
Ecu/$ rate(b) 0.35 0.36 0.4 0.46 0.55 0.68 0.85
(a) effects on unemployment as a percentage o f the labour force, (b) per cent deviation from base, 
(c) percentage point deviation from base.
The gains from abandoning Maastricht are rather limited, but they can be used 
to help gauge the potential scale of the effects of the Maastricht fiscal criteria. 
We could add the positive effects of this expansion and the negative effects 
of full implementation of Maastricht. Our analyses suggest that unemployment 
would be around 1.4 percentage points (2.2 million) lower in Europe as a 
whole if Maastricht were abandoned as compared to if it were implemented 
in full. However, we do not expect, and do not advocate, either the rigorous 
implementation of the criteria or the return to the fiscal profligacy pursued 





























































































In this paper we have argued that fiscal consolidation is necessary in Europe. 
A concerted fiscal contraction has some extra costs associated with it, but in 
the short to medium-term the employment (and output) costs of meeting the 
Maastricht fiscal criteria are not great, at least for the majority of countries. 
However it is not clear that it would be wise to induce countries with large 
debt stocks to contract rapidly. Any attempt to do so could have serious 
consequences for employment and output.
We have also argued that the effects of a fiscal action, if solvency is 
maintained, are ultimately transitory. The effects on output in, say, Germany 
disappear eventually if government spending is increased, but the deficit left 
unchanged. However, a permanent fiscal contraction should lower real interest 
rates, and recent research by Phelps (1992) and Barrell, Morgan and Pain 
(1995) has suggested that this will reduce unemployment directly. Hence 
short-term pain would be replaced by long-term gain, strengthening the 
argument for fiscal consolidation.
June 1996
National Institute of Economic and Social Research
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